Conspiracy Rhetoric

After reading some of Isaac’s Rhetoric of Conspiracy course packet (thank you, sir!), I have a better understanding of what conspiracy rhetoric generally looks like.  Some of these ideas may seem blatantly obvious, but as a whole they are very interesting and apply well to what I hope to examine.  In particular, these articles shed light upon the people who generate conspiracy theories, who might take them seriously, how conspiracy is communicated.  What I hope to understand from some of this theory is how we might use education (that is, knowledge of how conspiracy theory operates) as a way to combat the logic offered by Holocaust deniers as an alternative to legal remedies.

SPEAKER

Speakers of conspiracy rhetoric are often those who have been ostracized from mainstream society in one way or another.  Hans Toch explains this phenomenon in The Social Psychology of Social Movements.  "Conspiracy beliefs are prevalent among groups of people with a special kind of problem," he writes.  "Such beliefs tend to come into being at the intersection of self-regard and defeat: the urgency of the need to preserve one's self-image must be combined with bitterness of experienced failure" (Toch 63).  In other words, conspiracy theories often function as a coping mechanism for people who have experienced some kind of major failure, especially if the failure results from a greater philosophy of how the world works.  As Toch observes:

Conspiracy beliefs respond to a real need only for persons who cannot preserve their self-esteem unless they conceive themselves as victims of a plot [italics in original].  If no conspiracy were available to them, such persons would have to re-examine their assumptions with the foreknowledge that these were invalid.  They would have to re-evaluate their own worth in the face of accumulating lasting evidence of impotence” (69-70).

In Irving's case, this seems to be true.  As scholars began to discredit his work, his ideas shifted more toward the realm of conspiracy.  Much of what he said during the trial indicated that he believed that his downfall as a historian has been a direct result of an international conspiracy rather than from his own efforts.  As long as he can hold on to this conspiracy theory, Irving, as well as anyone who might take him seriously, do not have to examine his internal beliefs, motivations, methods, and conclusions.  However, this of course changes when these beliefs come under public scrutiny during and after the trial.  

AUDIENCE

"Birds of a feather flock together," the old adage says.  Like the speakers of conspiracy rhetoric, susceptible audiences generally consist of "persons who feel powerless and on the fringe of mainstream politics" (Nimmo and Combs 205).  This is not particularly surprising.  What is interesting here, however, is how conspiracy theorists transform the powerless into the powerful.  As Toch notes, conspiracy theories often operate under "the assumption that the conspiracy formula is available only to an enlightened elite” (Toch 53).  This is a staple of the rhetoric used by the the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust (CODOH).  If we can't openly debate the Holocaust, the argument goes, then we are being exposed only to what "they" want us to hear.  Come to us, and we'll give you the real story.  This strategy not only tempts listeners with the promise of forbidden fruit, but offers to transform the powerless into an elite and powerful group. 

STYLE

In an article in Harper’s Magazine, Richard Hofstader describes what he calls the “paranoid style” (3).  Hofstader defines this style as “the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people . . . [in which] the feeling of persecution is central, and it is indeed systematized in grandiose theories of conspiracy” (4).  Some of the basic elements of the paranoid style include the belief that “history is a conspiracy” (Hofstader 29), the use of “apocalyptic terms” (Hofstader 29), a labeled enemy who is “a perfect model of malice . . . sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving” (Hofstader 32), and a rhetor who “obsessively accumulates ‘evidence’” to convince nonbelievers (Hofstader 36).  Awareness of this style might help us better understand and decompose Holocaust denial rhetoric.

EDUCATION

Of course, using this theory solely to demonstrate that it operates within Holocaust denial rhetoric is not enough.  What all of this leads me to is the question of what education can do as a potential alternative to Holocaust denial laws.  One thing that I'm interested in (but will need to learn more about) is The Nizkor Project.  Nizkor (literally, "we will remember" in Hebrew) is an organization that attempts to combat Holocaust denial through education.  I am interested in finding out more about how it got started, how it operates, and what influence it might have.

As always, I look forward to your thoughts.

Works Cited

Hofstader, Richard.  "The Paranoid Style in American Politics."  Harper's.  Nov. 1964: 3-40.  Print

Nimmo, Dan, and James Combs.  Mediated Political Realities.  New York: Longman, 1983.  Print.  

Toch, Hans.  The Social Psychology of Social Movements. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965.  Print.